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A ‘society . . . divisible into the blessed and the
unblessed’: Michael Young and Meritocracy in
Postwar Britain
STEPHEN MEREDITH
Abstract
‘Meritocracy’ continues to unfold as both core conceptual framework and political ideal of
the language of social mobility. In recent decades, politicians of various hues have declared
it a sine qua non of the so-called ‘classless society’. The longer trajectory of postwar discourses
of equality reveal a more chequered conceptual past. Its origins in the forums of revisionist
social democracy of the 1950s, and subsequently popularised in the writings of social demo-
cratic polymath, Michael Young, are much more circumspect. The article considers pivotal
contributions and developments of this conceptual history and trajectory. It considers the ori-
gins and emergence of meritocracy as a dimension of discourses of equality in the 1950s, and
the formative contribution of Michael Young, reaction and responses on the left to his 1958
seminal work, The Rise of the Meritocracy, and the subsequent ‘meritocratic turn’. In spite of
its satirical origins and warnings of dire social consequences, meritocracy presently enjoys a
confirmatory position as a concept of opportunity and social mobility, as an embedded ideal
of social organisation and means of allocating differential rewards.
Keywords: Michael Young, meritocracy, opportunity, social mobility, equality, social democracy
Introduction
DEBATES CONCERNING the centrality of meritoc-
racy to contemporary discourses and policies
of social mobility have been reheated
recently by Theresa May’s (since diluted)
plans to reconsider an embargo on new
grammar schools. Her announcement in
September 2016 suggested that it was part of
an ambitious prospectus for Britain to
become the ‘world’s great meritocracy’. The
emphasis on access to selective grammar
schools and their provision of opportunity
and potentially greater social mobility is a
means by which to ‘build a country that
truly works for everyone, not just the privi-
leged few’.1 Likewise, Sajid Javid recently
described his ideal ‘Toryism’ as one which
challenges establishments, ‘radical’ and
‘meritocratic’. Directly referencing Michael
Young’s incongruously paradigmatic merito-
cratic formula, he believes that in a changing
Britain from the 1980s ‘new opportunities
awaited bright people who worked hard’; it
enabled his own trajectory from purportedly
Britain’s ‘most dangerous street’ to Home
Secretary. The primary role of his party
should be to revive and consolidate the key
message of this narrative, and herein lies
something of the debate over egalitarian
ethics and means, locked within and deter-
mined by narrow contours of ‘meritocracy’.2
Debates and arguments of meritocracy
have been a recurrent theme of postwar
British politics. Meritocracy as favoured
model of social organisation and economic
and technological progress has enjoyed
enhanced contemporary status. Notably
(and problematically for Young himself),
it was a conceptual staple of Tony Blair’s
New Labour governments as both object
and tool of policy, but has been a con-
sistent, often tacit, conceptual dimension
of arguments against attempts to reform
the selective component of the postwar
educational framework. Campaigning against
Labour’s comprehensive reorganisation from
the mid-1960s, former Conservative one-
nation group founder and future Thatcher-
ite ‘convert’, Angus Maude, for instance,
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agonised over reform of selective education
and grammar schools (as engines of meri-
tocracy). While willing to concede reform
of ‘over-rigid 11-plus selection’, removal of
‘all selection’ in favour of ‘strait-jacket uni-
formity’ would make it impossible to iden-
tify the ‘special talents and abilities of
every child’ and to deliver educational
needs accordingly. Lack of pluralism in
educational opportunities would threaten
standards and the ‘quality of . . . education,
and the whole future of our economy and
technology’.3
Numerous critics, building on Young’s
original dystopian vision, alternatively empha-
sise the limitations and potential disharmony
of a model of organisation and ‘equality’
based on narrow, selective opportunities and
routes to mobility. Recent studies show that,
apart from the USA, Britain has some of the
lowest levels of social mobility in the devel-
oped world, producing generational stasis,
as well as problems of unfulfilled talent
and a socially detached and disinterested
elite.4 Critics of the meritocratic platform
underline its propensity to create and con-
solidate (new) ‘elites’ and entrench (new)
social divisions based on narrow selection
and allocation of rewards. An inevitable by-
product of meritocratic competition is that
those disadvantaged by its restrictive criteria
face social inequality, as those able to navi-
gate obligatory ‘intelligence’ and ‘effort’ tests
are rewarded. Without embedded justifica-
tions for ‘failure’ of a system skewed in
favour of inherited status, meritocracy repro-
duces social divisions of an even more exclu-
sionary and unforgiving form.
The political status of meritocracy has
undergone significant postwar revision—
from its pejorative roots in Young’s original
satirical depiction, to an embedded contem-
porary ideal of social organisation and deter-
minant of individual social and economic
mobility and status. For advocates, it offers
an alternative, less select and more dynamic
and competitive approach to opportunity
and mobility than traditionally elitist, class-
based patterns of social organisation and
relationships. For critics, opposed to both its
focus on a narrow set of ‘academic’ attri-
butes and implications or preference for
particular forms of organisation, its ascen-
dancy reinforces elitist and individualistic
assumptions of neoliberal hegemony. It
imposes equally divisive social patterns
rather than the prospect of genuine and
inclusive opportunity and mobility for all.
The article considers something of the con-
ceptual history of meritocracy in postwar
Britain. It addresses the formative contribu-
tion of Michael Young to the origins and
emergence of meritocracy as a dimension of
egalitarian discourse, and reaction and
responses to his 1958 seminal work, The Rise
of the Meritocracy. In spite of his original
warning and satirical intent, meritocracy has
enjoyed a chequered career as a concept of
social mobility and equality and, to Young’s
apparent dismay, its interpretation has
shifted often indiscriminately to represent an
embedded ideal of social organisation and
means of allocating differential rewards.
The origins of a concept: Michael
Young and his contemporaries
Although Young is generally credited with
introducing the term to popular discourse,
discussions of meritocracy as both concept
and dilemma of social equality appear to
have evolved in a wider intellectual milieu
from the mid-1950s. The concept itself
appears to have formally surfaced in the
pages of the primarily social democratic
journal, Socialist Commentary, in a May 1956
article by industrial sociologist and indus-
trial relations expert, Alan Fox, and emerges
very largely as a form of social organisation
to be avoided at the risk of significant social
costs. Its egalitarian credentials, argued Fox,
were limited and potentially counter-pro-
ductive. Effectively, it would do little to
reduce ‘stratification’ based on ‘occupational
status’. Indisputable natural ‘law’ would
determine disproportionate reward of the
talented at the expense of those ostensibly
less gifted. It would result in a division of
the ‘blessed and the unblessed—those who
get the best and most of everything, and
those who get the poorest and the least.
This way lies the “meritocracy”’. Merito-
cratic attempts to merely devise bigger and
better ‘sieves’ to achieve wider forms of ‘op-
portunity’ would not resolve ‘extremes of
occupational status’ and ancillary social
divisions they produce and sustain. As such,
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it offered little more than the ‘vision of a
certain brand of New Conservatism’ rather
than a ‘vision of socialism’.5
The extent to which a society organised on
such a basis supported wider objectives of
economic and technical ‘progress’ remained
an equally moot point. The ‘economic’
dimension of meritocracy produced domi-
nant views of ‘big rewards for enterprise,
big incentives and differentials to stimulate
effort and initiative’ and ‘greatly superior
status’ for these groups. Alternatively, it was
not inconceivable that economic progress is
constrained by meritocratic social organisa-
tion and divisions and potentially ‘obstruc-
tive attitudes’ they produce. Potentially
different forms of social organisation held
out the prospect of more ‘positive co-opera-
tion’ of workers in productivity and techni-
cal change. Notwithstanding, they offered
the prospect of more equitable distribution
of resources and better quality of life and
happier society for all compatible with the
‘ethical’ basis of British socialism. It was not
incontrovertible that an ‘aristocracy . . . of
personal endowment’ was ethically superior
to an ‘aristocracy . . . of birth’.6
German-American political philosopher
and theorist, Hannah Arendt, similarly ges-
tated and presented a critique of meritocracy
at the point of first publication of Young’s
opus in 1958. In a celebrated critique of both
traditional and ‘progressive’ pedagogies,
which appears to have begun life as a 1954
lecture and essay and formally published in
1958, she primarily intended an examination
of perspectives of the allegedly declining
standards of American education, but also
explored something of its comparative con-
text and development. While she argued that
secondary education in the US was often
inadequate preparation for further study,
this was not necessarily or inevitably a result
of mass education and she was equally criti-
cal of the new narrowly selective system of
its British counterpart. The ‘dreaded’ 11-plus
examination, as filter of the ‘ten per cent’ of
grammar school entrants and those destined
for ‘higher education’, was the engine of a
‘meritocracy’ (and impossible to introduce at
the time in America in such a ‘rigorous’
manner). It reflected ‘once more the estab-
lishment of an oligarchy’, this time ‘not of
wealth or birth but of talent’. Under its
regime, Britain will continue to be governed
in all circumstances ‘neither as . . . monarchy
nor as . . . democracy but as . . . oligarchy or
aristocracy’ of the ‘most gifted’. The trend to
institutionalised meritocracy legitimises com-
paratively ‘intolerable’ and ‘almost physical
division of . . . children into gifted and
ungifted’ according to narrowly selective
measures of ability. As such, it ‘contradicts
. . . principle[s] of equality [and] equalitarian
democracy no less than any other oligarchy’.
As the new ‘oligarchy’ of the future, the
‘meritocracy not the democracy’—or a new,
‘legitimate’ aristocracy of genuine ‘talent’
and ‘merit’, self-belief and virtue—influence
key decisions in their own image and to
their own further reward.7
The concept and argument against meri-
tocracy received wider circulation and cur-
rency with the publication of Michael
Young’s tract on the dangers of a prospec-
tively hardened meritocracy. In The Rise of
the Meritocracy, Young imagined a fictional
future society characterised by the emer-
gence of a new class, fuelled through the
meritocratic thrust of educational reform and
its intrinsic early competitive selection pro-
cess. He counselled against the social conse-
quences of a society developed and ordered
on narrow meritocratic principles. Rather
than remove elitism and barriers to attain-
ment, the resulting ‘meritocracy’ would sim-
ply transform the pattern of inequalities,
arguably more pervasive, pernicious and
divisive than those grounded in differences
of class alone. Echoing Fox’s concerns, more
profound principles of cooperation, commu-
nity and equality would remain neglected
and unfulfilled.
Young’s own ethical vision of social organ-
isation, later reflected in much of his own
‘social entrepreneurship’, embraced more
inclusive and cooperative philosophy. Echo-
ing concerns of inevitable stratification of
those such as Fox, he offered a manifesto of
the genuinely pluralistic ‘classless society’
(subsequently critiqued in a review by Fox
himself as inattentive to the meritocratic
appeal of value in particular skill-sets in the
market). Here, people are evaluated ‘not
only according to their intelligence and their
education, their occupations and their
power, but according to their kindliness
and their courage, their imagination and
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sensitivity, their sympathy and their generos-
ity’. Who would say that the ‘scientist was
superior to the porter . . . the civil servant to
the lorry-driver with unusual skills’, the aca-
demic to the carer or nurse? A ‘pluralistic
society’ would be tolerant, diverse and non-
conformist, in which ‘individual differences
were actively encouraged . . . Every human
being would then have equal opportunity,
not to rise up in the world in the light of
any mathematical measure, but to develop
his or her own special capacities for leading
a full life’.8
Young’s satirical and pessimistic portrayal
of meritocracy—as thin and contracted and
defensive ‘opportunity’—was founded on
both the nature of his own conceptual
thought, which privileged an ethical social-
ism of fellowship and cooperation, and
engagement with emerging social research
themes of family, community and mutual-
ism. His vision of ‘egalitarian’ social change
grounded in narrowly defined and accessible
‘merit’ disappointed his broader communi-
tarian philosophy. He departed from the
broader revisionist social democratic empha-
sis on narrowly defined ‘equality’, pursued
through largely statist means, in favour of a
‘smaller-scale politics-of-cooperation’ and
fuller interpretation of ‘opportunity’ in a plu-
ral society. While not fundamentally
opposed to the revisionist dictum of equality
as the centrepiece of Labour’s story, ques-
tions of what it means and how to get there
were far less clear. Young was acutely aware
of the dangers of an unmediated meritocratic
‘equality of opportunity’, as his famous
satire demonstrates.
Anthony Crosland had already signalled
his own qualified concern over the ‘unfair-
ness’ of narrowly meritocratic distribution of
rewards (no doubt from discussions with
Young, whose views were broadly similar) in
his major 1956 revisionist text, The Future of
Socialism. He conceded that an ‘aristocracy of
talent’ improved on ‘hereditary aristocracy’ as
a concept of ‘social justice’, and that some
degree of ‘differential’ reward for those of
‘greater ability’ had practical purpose.
Nonetheless, if ‘privileges’ were so large ‘as to
create a distinct elite, differently educated and
socially select, it must be regarded as an
unpleasant concession to economic efficiency’.
To reward intelligence disproportionately
over other attributes of human experience, as
the basis of (re)creating conditions of ‘extreme
inequality’, appeared to contradict principles
of a ‘just society’ as the ‘fundamental ethical
case against any elite or aristocracy’.9
While both Crosland and Young identi-
fied meritocratic principles as an entrench-
ment of ‘formal equality of opportunity’
grounded in narrow and exclusive criteria,
and a potential source of new ‘social dis-
crimination’, Young was more explicit in
his belief that socialism was as much about
‘fraternity’. Without fraternity, it was more
likely that the new tendency to equality of
opportunity would ‘end up creating a
heartless meritocracy without a trace of no-
blesse oblige and dismissive of the needs
and claims of those who failed to make the
grade’. Without a fraternal critique of meri-
tocracy, postwar society would succeed
only in substituting elites.10 Young popu-
larised both the concept and embodiment
of the consequences of pursuit of an unsen-
timental ‘equality of opportunity’, which
had been a recent subject of critical discus-
sion within the wider salons of revisionist
social democracy. He echoed the emphasis
on ‘fellowship’ of the revisionist and com-
munitarian Socialist Union to which he was
closely linked, and which reflected an
emerging distinction of social democracy
between those focussed on simple distribu-
tive objectives and those who favoured a
more cooperative model and organisation.
The latter’s 1956 group publication, Twenti-
eth Century Socialism, addressed limitations
of a ‘liberal conception of equality’ and ‘op-
portunity’ interpreted merely as an ‘equal
start’. If it is not concerned with the ‘whole
bundle of opportunities which society dis-
tributes through a lifetime’ and responsive
to ‘different capacities and needs’, selective
and preferential characteristics or abilities
favour some over others in a ‘race left to
the swiftest’.11 Young designated this the
‘meritocracy’.
The Rise of the Meritocracy:
reception and critique
Young’s paradigmatic text was essentially a
diagnostic contribution to wider debates of
social democracy in the 1950s over the
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interpretation and operation of its newly
promoted organising principle. It disputed
the notion that an arrangement grounded in
narrow opportunity was sufficient. It would
serve only to focus finite resources and
attendant status in the hands of the ‘meritoc-
racy’, a fortunate minority equipped with
saleable abilities in the ‘public market’, and
confer additional rewards on those already
endowed. Following initial publication, the
book induced a range of critical notices and
responses and wider discussion of the rela-
tive value of ‘merit’ as a tool of social equal-
ity and likely trajectory and impact of
contemporary developments in education
and social change.
Reaction to The Rise of the Meritocracy
acknowledged its essential egalitarian mes-
sage. Describing it as ‘harsh and pessimistic’
in the dimensions of its nightmare, Labour
researcher and future Cabinet minister, Peter
Shore, also recognised its potential for misin-
terpretation. It was, he concluded, ‘certainly
not implausible’ and represented a ‘reason-
able projection of Mr Butler’s Opportunity
State’. He saw it not as an unadulterated ‘ar-
gument against the selection of talent, still
less a defence of inherited privilege’, but a
plea that ‘equality be more than opportu-
nity’. It should also embrace ‘power, educa-
tion and income’, and ‘should be made the
ruling principle of social order’, as the means
to a ‘better society . . . not just a more effi-
cient one’.12
Alan Fox, again writing in Socialist Com-
mentary, this time as commentator rather
than progenitor, cited the text in a long line
of dystopian fiction and social commentary
—including Huxley, Koestler, Orwell and
James Burnham’s chronicle of the relentless
rise of a managerial class—which served
society’s seemingly pathological need of fre-
quent nightmare projections of itself. In
Young’s case, it exhorted the further ‘spec-
tre’ of meritocracy, and this time we should
sit up and take notice. He identifies com-
mon preoccupation with the dangers of a
society in which unmediated meritocracy,
masked as ‘equality of opportunity’ and
uncritically cultivated by a complicit Labour
Party, offers mobility, status and reward to
a ‘scientifically’ selected and segregated few
of productive ‘intelligence’. By contrast, an
‘unproductive’ class is marginalised in a
system of rigid stratification, determined by
narrow merit-based ‘opportunity’, and more
acutely aware than ever of its ‘own demon-
strable inferiority’.13
Fox was, however, less sanguine about
Young’s ostensibly less radical prescriptions,
based on an alternative social philosophy of
‘plural values’. While it was no doubt laud-
able that the ‘Manifesto’ of the ‘classless
society’ should imbibe broader markers of
social value—not just ‘intelligence and . . .
education’ and ‘occupation and . . . power’,
but ‘kindliness and courage’, ‘imagination
and . . . generosity’, the lorry driver and
rose grower, as well as the scientist— it
would do little to downgrade inevitable
meritocratic appeal. While Young’s ‘plural
values’ may go some way to determining
the ‘worth of a society’, they ‘do not fetch
much’ in its public marketplace. Inevitably,
a ‘clever-boy’s paradise’ remains so long as
it is deemed a precondition of economic or
technological development, and its terms
are replicated and embedded in society.
Corresponding forms of social stratification
are inevitable, and the essential challenge
remains to ‘minimise the gaps and max-
imise the links between the strata’. As such,
it was unlikely that manipulation of out-
comes through the education system could
be brokered against vested interests in a
society forced by economic imperatives to
confront and submit to the precepts of meri-
tocracy. It was also unlikely that educa-
tional reform alone could take the strain if
extremes of income and ownership persisted
and as the socioeconomic effects of incipient
meritocracy hardened.
Nonetheless, with its potential (mis)appli-
cation to the new political rhetoric of ‘equal-
ity of opportunity’ and the ‘classless society’,
a language identified by Young through his
narrator, with ‘opportunity . . . coupled with
equality’ the Holy Grail of recent social
invention, it offered both political apologue
and cautionary tale. The so-called ‘Opportu-
nity State’ had become the ‘politicians’
equivalent to chastity. All of them are in
favour . . . from Mr. Bevan to Mr. Butler . . .
They disagree only about the shortest cut’.
This is what the country now wanted.
Or was it? Conservative critics, such as
Charles Curran in Encounter magazine, won-
dered if Young’s allegorical message was
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exaggerated. Why would those excluded
from the meritocracy ‘by I.Q. alone’ tolerate
their own exclusion, and would they not rise
in revolt far earlier than predicted in
Young’s ‘fable of 2034’? Young’s imagined
society in which full equality of opportunity
becomes institutionalised was a ‘philopro-
genitive’ impossibility, given the centrality
and protective capacity of the family unit.
Far from seeking a hard meritocracy, histori-
cally, socially and increasingly demographi-
cally people wanted a ‘society that protects
and cares for the untalented many’, and in
which the ‘ungifted majority can survive
and flourish’. Young’s was a ‘gross over-
simplification’ of the uncontested arena of
meritocracy, and involved selective use of
‘tendencies in contemporary Britain’ in a
‘sociological sleight-of-hand’. Insulated by
embedded characteristics of British society,
the British ‘lower classes need not start
advertising for a Spartacus just yet’.14
While arguably a reasoned criticism of
Young on publication in 1958, ostensible ‘ne-
oliberal’ developments of a later meritocratic
turn appeared to remove some of the com-
pound sociological barriers to attainment of
meritocracy. As David Kynaston suggests,
even if their early numbers and initial
potency were exaggerated, Young was offer-
ing more than ‘construction of a meritocratic
straw man’. By virtue of ‘their own endeav-
ours . . . as opposed to socio-economic back-
ground and connection’, in a system of
intelligence testing and selection for societal
roles, the new meritocrats ‘were on the
march’ from the 1950s. Young’s analysis was
‘tapping into’ very real social trends and, by
utilising the terminology of meritocracy, pro-
vided a useful conceptual lens through
which these developments could be viewed
and appraised.15
Young’s ‘neologism’ raised the spectre of
the emergence of an ‘IQ elite’ of postwar Bri-
tish society and economy or, as sociologist
and cultural critic, Richard Hoggart, termed
it, a new ‘aristocracy of brains’ or talent.16
Even Curran was forced to concede the con-
temporary relevance and impression of
Young’s intervention. By ‘calling his end-of-
rainbow State a “meritocracy”, he . . . coined a
valuable new word’, and provided a ‘shibbo-
leth to test the tongue of every aspirant to
power’ in modern Britain.17 It prompted
reviewers and commentators to consider
questions of whether something akin to mer-
itocracy had already emerged, the extent to
which it was or would become embedded,
and whether such a form of social organisa-
tion was desirable, necessary or could be
avoided. Like Arendt, they deliberated the
balance to be achieved between imperatives
of economic and technological competition
and efficiency, and potentially ‘anti-demo-
cratic’ impulses of meritocracy.
While Curran identified traditional socio-
logical cleavages and barriers to the consoli-
dation of meritocracy to the exclusion of
existing social patterns and dispositions,
Welsh Marxist theorist and critic, Raymond
Williams, was similarly unconvinced by the
reach of the new meritocracy. While a large
number of professional roles were increas-
ingly allocated on ‘educational merit’, this
did not unduly disrupt existing patterns of
political power. He saw little evidence in
contemporary Britain of ‘power being more
closely connected with merit, in any defini-
tion’. Power remained ‘largely elsewhere,
and no damned merit about it’. The new
meritocrats merely represented a type of ‘up-
per servant’ class, ‘which may be as high as
they can reasonably expect to travel’.18 From
different perspectives, existing social struc-
tures and practices and processes of democ-
racy would head off the rise and
entrenchment of unmitigated meritocracy.
In contrast, much of the initial response to
Young’s representation of meritocracy pre-
dicted its inevitability, with more or less
enthusiasm and very largely from the
common position on grounds of economic
efficiency, competition and growth. The
Economist described the meritocracy as an
‘odious place’, in which ‘mania for capital
expansion’ diminishes requirements of ‘hu-
man welfare’ and ‘economic productivity
rules the ends of human society’, but in one
form or another is on its way. Even the most
rigid comprehensive education, as long as it
does not flatten ability, is unlikely to ‘keep
that ability in the working class’. As such,
the meritocracy represented an ‘elite of top
people, no longer encumbered with heredi-
tary . . . dumb-clucks’ overseeing a ‘new and
paradoxically wide-open, caste system’.19
From the right, the inevitability and promise
of meritocracy were more enthusiastically
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embraced. The Times observed positively
that ‘for the first time . . . we are advancing
ability wherever it is found’. If our ‘eco-
nomic survival depends on discovering and
promoting’ the best talent, there is ‘no get-
ting away from the rise of the meritocracy in
a scientific world’. Young’s conception of
comprehensive schooling of a common cur-
riculum for all children would not remove
cleavages in society, as ‘such schools would
still be selective instruments’. The Spectator
urged that the text addressed the most fun-
damental of postwar developments and con-
cerns, but that Young was ‘dilatory in
shouldering his pole [for] the banner of
Social Mobility’.20 The competitive demands
of economic growth, industrial, and technical
development, required the production of the
type of academic elite and subsequent meri-
tocracy Young looked to proscribe.
From anti-meritocratic impulse to
the meritocratic turn
Young’s was an attempt to offer an extrap-
olative account of credible developments
and costs of postwar social trends which,
through its core concept, has been widely
influential, with both welcome and not so
welcome political consequences. Its influence
in educational reform and attempts to reduce
the impact of social division fostered
through narrow selection and segregated
opportunities has not reduced its operative
predictive capacity and frequent (mis)appro-
priation. In spite of some academic criticism
of its method and style, it offered both
insightful writing on the drivers of educa-
tional structures and policies and ‘sociologi-
cal analysis in the form of . . . satire’, the
central concept of which has attained and
retained civic currency and application (in
both intended and unintended ways).
As a satirical, but full-frontal assault on
the nascent meritocratic compulsion of post-
war education and economic policy, it argu-
ably had most practical influence in the
1960s and 1970s. It provided an ‘important
intellectual propellant’ of the challenge to
11-plus streaming and consequently the
dominant position of grammar schools.
Influenced by Young, Anthony Crosland, as
Labour’s Secretary of State for Education
and Science after 1964, famously declared to
his wife following dinner with the ‘Joint 4’
teachers’ associations his desire to ‘destroy
every fucking grammar school in England
. . . And Wales. And Northern Ireland’ (Scot-
land was beyond his charge). His govern-
ment took comprehensive schooling beyond
the preserve of local initiatives to a broader
principle of policy to be rolled out nation-
ally. Whatever views of its readiness, ambi-
tion or outcomes (and there are numerous
criticisms of its relative quality, public sup-
port and propensity to ‘lock’ pupils into
backgrounds as effectively as its predeces-
sor), Young had implanted an ‘anti-merito-
cratic’ seed. In addition to helping to
‘abolish the 11-plus’, Young’s conceptual
analysis ‘made the left think more carefully
about equal opportunity and prompted
more support for a pluralistic society’.21
Young projected his original concept of
meritocracy almost as the antithesis of wider,
inclusive, egalitarian reform and objectives.
Paradoxically, it has come to represent both
the desirable and functional model of socioe-
conomic organisation and reward, and key
means of ‘progressive’ social change. This
latter transformation of its meaning and
application has served to underline both the
prescience and durability of his analysis.
Prior trends towards organisational stan-
dardisation have been reversed without
notions of ‘unstreamed’, mixed-ability
schools and classes having ever achieved full
acceptance. Following the election of the
‘arch-meritocrat’, Margaret Thatcher, in 1979,
a gradual ‘popular’ transition back to a prin-
cipally meritocratic ethos (if it ever disap-
peared) and organisation occurred from the
mid-1980s, and the bitter debate over the rel-
ative economic and social dimensions and
priorities of meritocratic selection continues
to this day. In the ‘ups and downs of . . .
meritocracy’, it appeared that by the end of
the 1970s the ‘book’s political message had
had its day. The task was complete: the mer-
itocracy had been shafted’, but a politician
or politics ‘in the grip of an idea’ can be a
‘dangerous’ thing.22
Arguably, this does not justly acknowl-
edge the wider circulation of ideas and
applications of meritocracy which supported
a broader meritocratic turn from the 1970s.
As early as 1972, for instance, American
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political sociologist, Daniel Bell, presented
the ‘logic’ of a new ‘post-industrial society’
as that of meritocracy underpinning a shift
to the new ‘knowledge economy’. Under cer-
tain tempered conditions, this would consti-
tute a ‘meritocracy . . . of the just’. Politicians
of all shades have since drawn similar con-
clusions over potential ‘conflicts with other
social objectives’ if meritocratic principles of
differential rewards to stimulate ‘productive
wealth’ are left untapped. These arguments
of priorities appear to have neglected Bell’s
secondary or corresponding ‘fairness princi-
ple’, on which the differences are not con-
verted into ‘large, discrepant material and
social advantages’ and society remains gen-
uinely open to the fullest possible extent.23
Intellectually and politically, Young’s origi-
nally dissonant concept has enjoyed a come-
back, this time as a ‘positive’—pervasive and
persuasive—means by which to market the
language of mobility and attendant financial
and social rewards, differentials of which are
increasingly and palpably visible.
Conclusion
Young intended his original satirical concept
to presage the dangers of the rise of a new
elitism based on a ‘narrow band of values’, a
warning he believed has been lost on, or
unheeded by, politicians who have not read
his book. Reflecting on the evolution of his
central concept at the beginning of the new
millennium, he believed much of what he
had predicted had come to pass. For Young,
meritocracy had achieved new legitimacy
and added potency through association with
the recent politics of the centre-left and
wider narratives and institutions of equality,
which has served only to underwrite the
shifting interpretive terrain of his concept as
an indispensable ‘means of breaking down
established hierarchies of privilege’. He was
disappointed to see it embraced as a positive
egalitarian philosophy and guide to public
policy by Tony Blair and New Labour.
While manifold political advocates con-
tinue to laud the ‘fairness’ of social organisa-
tion which rewards resources of intelligence
and effort, its critics emphasise its essentially
‘neoliberal’ features of individualism and
competition in the guise of ‘opportunity for
all’ and embodied in ‘parables of progress’.
They argue that opportunities for many are
effectively closed down by defensive and
protective tendencies of meritocracy, with a
concomitant hardening of and desensitisation
to social inequalities. Rather than disrupting
pyramids of ‘success’ and status, meritocracy
merely replaces and reproduces those hierar-
chies. Meritocratic social mobility for a nar-
rowly ‘talented’ and subsequently self-
serving elite does not offer an egalitarian
panacea. Rather, it produces its own order in
which those who succeed rehearse the claim
that they have meritoriously applied their
intelligence and effort to the exclusion of
those deemed not to have made the grade
and to the further strain of the social fabric.
Unlike Conservative and New Labour repre-
sentations of the so-called ‘classless society’,
Young believed that meritocracy ‘narrows
potential rather than widens it; treats the less
intelligent as inferior, rather than as individ-
uals with their own [different] talents’. Con-
temporary narratives of meritocracy have
enabled a society stratified by ‘merit’, in
which the ‘poor and disadvantaged’ have
been ‘done down’. Branded at school ‘ac-
cording to education’s narrow band of val-
ues’, they become even ‘more vulnerable for
later unemployment’. They are ‘easily . . .
demoralised by being looked down on so
woundingly by [those] who have done well
for themselves. It is hard . . . in a society that
makes so much of merit to be judged as hav-
ing none. No underclass has ever been left
as morally naked as that’.24
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